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The Naked Rambler got a total of 15 months and 26 days' jail for his latest episodes of nudity after picking up further breach of the peace and contempt convictions in Perth Sheriff Court on 24 November 2010.

Sheriff Robert McCreadie found that not only was the Rambler's brief naked departure from Perth prison on 29 October (noted here) a breach of the peace, but also his refusal to dress for his trial was contempt.

For those who have not spotted it already, our headline comes courtesy of Lord Byron – see here for more.

Having shoogled the criminal lawyers in Cadder, the Supreme Court shook up the orderly world of conveyancing and repossession from defaulting debtors with its judgment in Royal Bank of Scotland v Wilson [2010] UKSC 50, issued on 24 November 2010.

RBS v Wilson was a case about how the creditor in a standard security might eject the defaulting debtor from the property over which the debt was secured.  The relevant legislation stated that the debtor's default had to be preceded by "formal requisition"; the creditor bank argued that a certificate of default lodged in court under section 24(2) of the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 met this requirement.  This was practice established over the last forty years, even although section 19(1) of the 1970 Act said that the creditor intending to exercise the power to eject "shall serve a notice calling-up the security in conformity with Form A of Schedule 6 of this Act" (with which the certificate of default under section 24(2) did not comply).  Practice allowing the certificate of default procedure to be enough was based upon the writings of the late Jack Halliday, sometime Professor of Conveyancing at Glasgow University and "architect" (although not draftsman) of the 1970 Act.  Halliday had written that the creditor in our situation "may" serve a calling up notice, which was an "additional" remedy (see para 47 of the Supreme Court judgment, per Lord Rodger).  But, said Lord Rodger (as a Glasgow graduate), "in the end even a word from Professor Halliday would have to yield to the words of Parliament" (para 49).  "Shall" here was an imperative word; and properly understood, Professor Halliday had not said anything different.  Only a calling-up notice would do before the debtors could be ejected; this was an important piece of debtor protection.  Lord Hope (an Edinburgh graduate) is more dismissive of Professor Halliday's reading (see para 68) and says, "The answer to the problem is to be found in the words of the statute, to which all too frequently insufficient attention appears to have been given" (para 72).

Scots Law News recalls wise words from the Wilson Lecture given by Professor Eric Clive as the Scottish Parliament began its life as a legislature in 1999:

“‘Shall’ is an imprecise word with several shades of meaning. When it states a result brought about by the Act itself, it is better replaced by ‘is’. …. The New Zealand Law Commission has recommended the use of the present tense and indicative mood whenever possible, and the replacement of ’shall’ by ‘must’ where a duty or prohibition is intended. … I would like to see the routine use of the word ’shall’ banned from Acts of the Scottish Parliament.” (Edinburgh Law Review vol 3 (1999) at p 143)

Professor Clive attacked the famous opening provision of the Scotland Act 1998 – “There shall be a Scottish Parliament.”  “But what,” asks Professor Clive, “does ’shall’ mean in that sentence?”  RBS v Wilson, where in the end everything turned on whether "shall" meant "may" or "must", confirms the Clive line, I fear.  See here for further comment from Brian Heaney on the UKSC blog.

A week earlier, on 17 November 2010, the Supreme Court also surprised some with its decision in Multi-Link Leisure Developments Ltd v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] UKSC 47, which was about the interpretation of a lease between the parties, in particular the method of valuation to be deployed in fixing the sale price when the tenant (Multi-Link) exercised an option to buy the land in question from the Council.  The conflicting interpretations made a difference of near enough £5 million.  The surprise lies in each of the contrasting approaches of Lords Hope and Rodger to what seems to have been a bungled piece of self-contradictory drafting. 

Lord Hope solves the problem of ambiguity (which he says is a pre-requisite for going beyond the document in the search for meaning, so going against a categoric but un-cited statement to the opposite effect by the First Division in Luminar Lava v Mama Group [2010] CSIH 1, para 38) by setting aside some of the wording used as making no commercial sense (but not disclosing the basis on which he is able to reach that conclusion).  This although he criticises the court below for taking inadequate account of all the words in the contract.

Lord Rodger imposes no requirement of ambiguity but says that in such cases of bungled drafting one should start with the words one can understand to see if they help with the ones you can't – a new approach to this difficult subject.  It leads him to decide that the parties' agreed meaning for a particular section cannot be accepted.  Then he finds that words which were not in the contract at all can be used to decide what the commercial sense of the document must have been.

All very interesting.  At least their Lordships reach the same conclusion (the Council wins), and also uphold the Extra Division's conclusion to the same effect ([2009] CSIH 96), while being critical of its reasoning.  Their fellow Supreme Court Justices divide 2-1 as to which of the alternative approaches they prefer, Lord Rodger winning out here.  Since Lord Glennie in the Outer House reached a different conclusion as to the correct result ([2009] CSOH 114), the case viewed as a whole provides a fascinating example of judges offering at least four distinct approaches to the solution of an admittedly knotty problem.  Advisers meantime must wonder what the law is. 

It is however noteworthy that Lord Glennie handed down his Multi-Link opinion on 31 July 2009 and the case then sped through to its final decision in the Supreme Court less than 18 months later.  Compare RBS v Wilson, which began with proceedings in Edinburgh Sheriff Court in April 1998. 

Quite apart from their specific interest as a major decision shaking the Scottish criminal justice system to its roots, the Supreme Court judgments in Cadder v HMA [2010] UKSC 43 contain numerous points worth attention from a more general point of view.

First, the United Kingdom made no attempt to intervene in the preceding Salduz case in 2008, despite its (one would have thought) fairly obvious implications for the Scottish legal system.  Were relevant eyes not on this particular ball at the time?

Second, when should a United Kingdom court regard itself as bound to follow a decision of the European Court of Human Rights?  The answer seems to be that at any rate an unanimous decision of the Court's Grand Chamber (such as Salduz) should be followed; perhaps then the decision of a split Chamber is not binding.  And certainly there is precedent, cited at para 45 of Lord Hope's judgment, that decisions of Sections of the Court which are based on misunderstandings or lack full consideration of law in the United Kingdom need not be applied.  But in any event the Court itself had consistently applied Salduz and a number of ECHR member states which had not previously afforded a right to legal representation at police interviews of suspects were now changing their laws in the light of this jurisprudence.  This suggested that the decision was not one upon which the Court could be persuaded to go back.

Third, both Lords Hope and Rodger go into the history of the rule in Scotland denying suspects in police custody the right to legal representation.  Introduced in its current form by statute in 1980, the legislation followed recommendations in the Report of the Thomson Committee on Criminal Procedure in Scotland (1975).  The Report said how –

"… criminals can render the investigation of their crimes difficult or even impossible merely by standing on their rights.  [The solution] must recognise the realities of the situation, and take account of those police practices which are accepted as fair by the public including criminals although they may be technically illegal or at least of doubtful legality.  (para 2.03) …  We recommend that a solicitor should not be permitted to intervene in police investigations before charge.  The purpose of the interrogation is to obtain from the suspect such information as he may possess regarding the offence, and this purpose might be defeated by the participation of his solicitor."

Thus, given that the basis of Salduz was primarily a concern to protect the suspect against self-incrimination, the Scottish rule, being explicitly based upon the proposition that the accused must be given every chance to incriminate himself, could not possibly stand, whatever the other safeguards (such as corroboration) that might exist in the system.

Fourth, prospective over-ruling.  As is well-known, the courts in the United Kingdom declare the law as it has always been, not change it.  In effect, their decisions have retrospective effect.  The fear in Cadder was that the decision of the Supreme Court would have the effect of invalidating every conviction achieved through the use of evidence from police interviews of suspects without a lawyer present on the suspect's behalf.  Further, while the Scotland Act 1998 gives the courts power to remove or limit any retrospective effect of a decision that an Act of the Scottish Parliament is beyond legislative competence, there is no such power with regard to the acts of Scottish Ministers and the Lord Advocate.  Lord Hope therefore thinks that a possible inherent power in a court to limit the retrospective effects of its decision cannot apply (paras 58-59).  Instead, with Lord Rodger, he finds a solution in a principle articulated by Murphy CJ in the Irish Supreme Court in A v The Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] IESC 45: retrospectivity does not apply to cases decided under the previous understanding of the law that are now "closed".  The new understanding applies only to cases that have not yet gone to trial, cases where the trial is still in progress, and appeals have been brought timeously but not yet concluded.

Discussing this point both Lords Hope and Rodger refer to the power of the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) to refer closed cases back to the Court of Criminal Appeal on the grounds of a possible miscarriage of justice.  The Justices say that it will be for the Commission to decide whether it is in the public interest to refer cases which involved the use of evidence obtained from police interviews of a suspect at which the latter had no legal representation, and for the Appeal Court to decide what to do if such a reference is made (paras 62, 103).  This explains section 7 of the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 (passed by the Scottish Parliament in a single day (27 October)).  It states two new rules as follows:

In determining whether or not it is in the interests of justice that a reference should be made, the Commission must have regard to the need for finality and certainty in the determination of criminal proceedings.

Where the Commission has referred a case to the High Court … the High Court may … reject the reference if the Court considers that it is not in the interests of justice that any appeal arising from the reference should proceed.

The apparent breadth of these provisions will, one hopes, be tempered by judicial realisation that such general words must be read in the context of the Act as a whole, i.e. as restricting any attempts to use Cadder in relation to closed cases before the SCCRC.  We shall see.

Finally, the Supreme Court decision has cemented that court's unpopularity with the Scottish judiciary, at least so far as its jurisdiction in devolution issues and criminal law matters is concerned.  It was not perhaps a coincidence that on 24 September 2010 the Advocate General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness, QC) launched a short "informal" consultation on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the decisions of the Lord Advocate (closing date 22 October).  An Expert Group chaired by Sir David Edward is now deliberating on the matter.  The outcome of the consultation and the deliberations of the Expert Group is not known at the time of writing, but one might have thought that the Scotland Bill provided a convenient vehicle for implementing any change to the present law that may be thought needful.

 

Angus Stewart QC was elevated to the Court of Session and High Court bench on 5 November 2010, and has taken the judicial title Lord Stewart.  His career is summarised here on the Judiciary of Scotland website.

Not mentioned on the Judiciary website, however, is Lord Stewart's contribution to legal history, as editor of two of the four volumes of the Faculty of Advocates Minute Book published by the Stair Society (vols 46 and 53 in the Society's series).  Both volumes, which together cover the momentous period 1751-1798, are distinguished by the editor's well-researched and elegantly written introductions.  They appeared in 1999 and 2008 respectively (the latter being co-edited with Dr David Parratt). 

Lord Stewart also contributed two articles to the Stair Society's fourth Miscellany volume (vol 49 in the Society's series, published in 2002).  The first provides the essential introduction to the Session Papers, a key source in particular for eighteenth-century Scots law, and the second illustrates the use to which the source may be put under the title "Sir Walter Scott and the tenants of Invernenty".

Moving away from legal history to the joys of medical negligence, Lord Stewart's article "‘Damages for the Birth of a Child" (1995) 40 JLSS 298 was influential in the famous decision of the House of Lords, MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 SC (HL) 1.

It is clear that in Lord Stewart we have yet another Scottish scholar judge, and Scots Law News looks forward to a distinguished tenure on the bench, while also hoping that there may yet be further contributions on legal history from his able pen (or word processor). 

Our thanks to fellow blogger Lallands Peat Worrier who has drawn our attention to the splendid public indecency case decided on 1 November 2010 by the Court of Criminal Appeal, holding that the Eastern Necropolis, Dundee, was not "public" in the sense required for the commission of the offence by the performance of fellatio within the graveyard's bounds.

Lallands Peat Worrier, to whom we must refer readers for all details, presents the story in Burnsian mode, recalling Tam O'Shanter's misadventures with Cutty Sark at Alloway Kirk on Hallowe'en.  Scots Law News was rather reminded of the metaphysical poet Andrew Marvell addressing his coy mistress, whence our headline.  For those who don't know Marvell, the next line of his chat-up poem – and indeed the whole poem – can be consulted here.  Clearly starting from a sound proposition, his metaphysics led him to a mistaken conclusion.  Perhaps he had never visited Dundee?

Scots Law News learns from unimpeachable sources (STV and the Scottish Sun) that Naked Rambler Steve Gough was released from Perth Prison on Friday 29 October 2010 but, being as ever without apparel, he was then rearrested at the prison gates.

A brief (and of course naked) appearance from custody in Perth Sheriff Court on Monday 1 November, charged with breach of the peace, led to his being remanded in custody once more.

The pantomime season approaches. 

The long and much-anticipated decision of the UK Supreme Court in Cadder v HM Advocate was published on 26 October 2010 ([2010] UKSC 43).  As expected, the seven-judge court decides that the human rights of a person detained by the police without immediate access to a lawyer are thereby infringed; but the major hassle that might have occurred were the decision to have been fully retrospective is avoided by holding the judgment not applicable to already closed cases.

The UK Supreme Court press release reads as follows:

BACKGROUND

The question in this appeal is whether a person who has been detained by the police in Scotland on suspicion of having committed an offence has the right of access to a lawyer prior to being interviewed.

Sections 14 and 15 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 allow a police constable to detain a person whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting has committed or is committing an offence punishable by imprisonment. Detention may last for up to six hours. During detention, the police may put questions to the detainee, although the detainee is under no obligation to answer them and is to be informed at the outset of the detention that he is under no such obligation. The detainee is entitled to have a solicitor informed of his detention. However, in terms of the statute, the detainee has no right of access to a solicitor. The question is whether that is a breach of the right to a fair trial, recognised in Article 6(1) and 6(3)(c) of the European Convention of Human Rights (“the ECHR”).

The Appellant was detained by the police on suspicion of serious assault and cautioned, in line with the statute, that he did not have to answer any question, beyond giving his name, address, date and place of birth and nationality. He was told that he was entitled to have a solicitor informed of his detention but he did not exercise that right. He was interviewed without a lawyer being present.

During interview, the Appellant made a number of admissions. At trial the Crown led evidence of the police interview with the Appellant and relied on the admissions. The Appellant was convicted. In Salduz v Turkey (2008) 49 EHRR 421 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that there had been a violation of Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(c) ECHR because Salduz had not had the benefit of legal advice when he was in police custody. In Her Majesty’s Advocate v McLean [2009] HCJAC 97, the High Court of Justiciary (sitting with seven judges) held that, notwithstanding the decision in Salduz, it was not a violation of Articles 6(1) & 6(3)(c) ECHR for the Crown to rely at trial on admissions made by a detainee while being interviewed without having had access to a solicitor. This was because the guarantees otherwise available in the Scottish legal system (and, in particular, the requirement that there be corroborated evidence in order to convict) were sufficient to provide for a fair trial. In the present case, relying on the decision in McLean, the appeal court refused the Appellant leave to appeal against his conviction. In effect, therefore, the present case is an appeal against the decision in McLean.

JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court unanimously grants leave to appeal and then goes on to allow the appeal. The ECHR requires that a person who has been detained by the police has the right to have access to a lawyer prior to being interviewed, unless in the particular circumstances of the case there are compelling reasons to restrict that right. The Supreme Court remits the case to the High Court of Justiciary for further procedure. Lord Hope (Deputy President) delivers the leading judgment, with which Lord Mance agrees. Lord Rodger delivers a separate judgment, agreeing with Lord Hope but adding observations of his own. Lord Walker, Lord Brown, Lord Kerr and Sir John Dyson SCJ agree with the reasons given by both Lord Hope and Lord Rodger.

REASONS FOR THE JUDGMENT
The High Court of Justiciary’s decision in McLean was entirely in line with previous domestic authority: [29] That authority cannot, however, survive in light of the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Salduz and in subsequent cases. Properly interpreted, Salduz requires a detainee to have had access to a lawyer from the time of the first interview unless there are compelling reasons, in light of the particular circumstances of the case, to restrict that right: [35], [36], [38] & [70]. The exception applies only if there are particular circumstances in the individual case and does not allow a systematic departure from the rule such as that set up by the 1995 Act: [41]. The rule in Salduz is based on the right not to incriminate oneself: [33] & [67].

This court should follow Salduz. Indeed, it has no real option but to do so: [93]. Previous cases have established that the court should follow any ‘clear and consistent jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court’: [45]. Salduz is a decision of the Grand Chamber, now firmly established in the European Court of Human Rights’ case law: [48]. The majority of those member states which prior to Salduz did not afford a right to legal representation at interview (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Ireland) are reforming their laws to bring them into line with the Convention’s requirements: [49]. The guarantees otherwise offered by the Scottish legal system (in particular corroboration) are commendable but are beside the point. They do not address the European Court’s concern, which is with self-incrimination: [50], [66] & [92]. The system of detention under section 14 and 15 of the 1995 Act was expressly designed to deny an individual, reasonably suspected of committing a crime, a right to obtain legal advice when questioned in the hope that, without legal advice, the individual would be more likely to incriminate himself during questioning: [91]. That view of where the balance is to be struck between the public interest and the rights of the accused is irreconcilable with Convention rights: [51]. There is not the remotest chance that the European Court would hold that, because of the other protections that Scots law provides for accused persons, the Scottish system could omit the safeguard of allowing legal advice prior to interview: [93].

The Lord Advocate could not rely upon section 57(3) of the Scotland Act 1998 to prevent her act of leading the evidence of the interview from being unlawful. Section 57(3) would apply where, because of another provision of legislation, the Lord Advocate could not have acted any differently or where she acted to give effect to another provision which could not be read in a way which complies with Convention rights. Neither applied here because of the drafting of section 14(7) of the 1995 Act: [54] & [55].

This decision does not permit closed cases to be re-opened. Although a judicial decision has retrospective effect, it does not affect cases which have been finally determined (namely, where an accused was convicted and did not appeal within the relevant time limits, or did appeal and the appeal has been finally disposed of). The decision will, however, affect cases which have not yet gone to trial, where the trial is still in progress or where an appeal has been brought in time and is not yet concluded. The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, if it is asked to do so, will have to determine whether it is in the public interest for cases which have already been finally determined to be referred to the High Court, which will in turn have to decide how to deal with such cases, if a reference is made: [60] – [62]; [99] – [103].

Cabinet Secretary for Justice Kenny MacAskill issued the following statement following the publication of the Supreme Court's judgment:

"I note today's decision by the Supreme Court. It is a decision we did not seek but it is one to which we must respond.

"The decision overturns decades of criminal procedure in Scotland, a proud, distinctive, justice system, developed over centuries, and predicated on fairness with many rigorous protections for accused persons. It is rightly admired by other jurisdictions. This issue is about legal advice at one step in the investigatory process.

"Today's judgement in the Supreme Court has gone against the unanimous decision last October by seven Scottish High Court judges at the Scottish Appeal Court that determined that an aspect of Scottish criminal procedure does not comply with the European Convention on Human Rights.

"We are concerned that the current devolution arrangements have created an anomaly that seems to put Scottish law at a disadvantage in comparison to elsewhere in the EU. I want to see steps taken to address this anomaly. But we cannot ignore the Supreme Court's decision.

"And while it necessitates changes to Scotland's justice system, these are changes that have been anticipated and planned for. For over a year, the Scottish Government, Crown Office, Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB), ACPOS and the Scottish Court Service have been preparing contingency plans to deal with all possible eventualities arising from this case. The Lord Advocate – in anticipation of an adverse judgement – issued interim guidance earlier this year.

"With Parliament's support we will be making swift legislative changes to protect the victims of crime and safeguard communities. The main changes will mean introducing a right of access to legal advice before being questioned, extending the period during which a person may be detained under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, powers to adjust legal aid eligibility rules and measures to ensure certainty and finality in concluded cases.

"We will be introducing this emergency legislation to Parliament on Tuesday – and with the support of the other political parties we can complete the parliamentary scrutiny and debate process during the course of Wednesday. We anticipate the Bill receiving Royal Assent by Friday.

"In addition to these necessary legislative changes, I am today announcing that Lord Carloway, a senior High Court judge, will lead a review of Scottish criminal law and practice in the aftermath of the Cadder decision. I have asked Lord Carloway to make swift progress with his review and report to me within months – certainly in time to allow legislation to be considered for the 2011-12 Parliamentary session.

"Our distinctive justice system is one which protects accused persons. However human rights also extend to victims and to all of the people of Scotland, and the Scottish Government and justice partners will continue to fight to ensure that the rights of the victims and indeed wider society remain at the forefront of the Scottish justice system."

The Lord Advocate also issued a statement, as follows:

“The Supreme Court’s judgment in Cadder v HMA is a significant ruling for Scots law. 

“Until today, the Scottish legislation regarding access to a solicitor prior to and during police detention was held to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.  Indeed Scotland’s highest criminal Court of Appeal looked at this very issue in the case of McLean less than a year ago.  In that case seven judges held unanimously at that time that Scots law and practice was compatible with the Convention requirements.

“Prosecutors work within the law made by Parliament and as interpreted and stated by the courts. Today’s ruling in Cadder changes understanding of the law as set out in McLean, and so we will immediately adapt our working practices to this new legal landscape.

“I note that the Court has stated that its decision does not apply to cases that have been finally determined. This very significantly limits the number of cases potentially affected by this judgment.

“In preparation for the possibility of this change, we have been working with the police and the Scottish Government to minimise the risk to live cases. We have of course taken precautionary measures: in early 2009 I issued guidance to prosecutors, instructing them only to use admissions made by suspects who had not had legal advice before interview in a police station where this was considered essential for the Crown case. Earlier this year, following the hearing before the Supreme Court, I issued Guidelines to the police requiring them to provide access to a solicitor prior to and during interview. 

“Unlike any other jurisdiction in Europe, Scots law requires two sources of evidence to support each essential fact in a prosecution. This rule of ‘corroboration’ presents a further challenge to prosecution in Scotland, which does not apply in this wholesale manner in other jurisdictions.

“The balance of rights for accused in Scotland will now need to be carefully considered. It must be ensured that the Convention rights of victims to have ‘effective criminal sanctions in place’ are maintained where their human rights are flouted by the criminal actions of another.

“In light of this, I welcome the announcement by the Cabinet Secretary for Justice of Lord Carloway’s review of the laws of criminal procedure and evidence in Scotland following the Supreme Court’s decision. I consider such a review important to ensure, as the Supreme Court itself recognises at paragraph 97 of its opinion ‘that any revised scheme is properly balanced and makes for a workable criminal justice system’.

“The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service will continue to work with the police and with the Scottish Government to protect the integrity of pending prosecutions.”

This is the title of an e-Petition submitted to the Scottish Parliament on 8 October 2010. 

The petition called on the Scottish Parliament "to urge the Scottish Government to open an independent inquiry into the 2001 Kamp van Zeist conviction of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988."

The Scottish Parliament's Public Petitions Committee discussed the petition on 9 November 2010, and agreed to write to the Scottish Government asking what legal authority supported the statement that holding any inquiry into the case was beyond its power and authority, and in particular the inability of any inquiry to compel witnesses.  The petitioners, who gave oral evidence to the Committee, argued that there was no legislation restricting the Scottish Government's holding an inquiry, and that legislation existed under which witnesses could indeed be compelled to come before the inquiry.  The Scottish Government was aked to reply by 10 December 2010.

The Legal Services (Scotland) Bill completed its parliamentary passage on 6 October 2010, including the controversial provision that will allow non-lawyer ownership of Scottish law firms to the extent of 49%.

While the Bill still has to pass the procedures required under the Scotland Act 1998 before it becomes law, its failure to do so seems most unlikely to this observer, although the possibility of challenge in the courts remains.

There remain questions, however, about whether Tesco, or even Waitrose (currently planning expansion in Scotland), are really interested in buying into the provison of legal advice to consumers in Scotland.  No sign yet of bids from the supermarkets or, even worse, the unchastened banks. 

Much more plausible are the rumours reaching the ears of Scots Law News that smaller Scottish firms are planning networks and link-ups, possibly even more, with which to respond to the new business environment in which they now find themselves. 

That seems a more rational response, and one much more likely to succeed, than battles to the death in the last ditch of an "independent" legal profession.  In the end it is what you can do for your clients that determines your business future.

See here and here for previous stages of the debate.

The Lord Advocate, Elish Angiolini QC, announced on 1 October 2010 that she would stand down from her post after the next Scottish Parliament elections, which will be held in May 2011.

Ms Angiolini's career as the first woman and solicitor to be, first, Solicitor General for Scotland and then Lord Advocate, has been tracked here, here and here in Scots Law News.  It is one of the most remarkable careers in modern Scots law – and it doesn't seem likely that it is over yet.  A career prosecutor who reached the very top of that particular tree and who has only just turned 50 will surely have further plans.

We can also enjoyably speculate about who her successor will be.  Will any change in the political colour of the next Scottish administration have an impact on the appointment, or will there be a promotion from within the Crown Office?  It will be recalled that Ms Angiolini was appointed to high office under the pre-2007 Lab-Lib Dem coalition but continued on in office as Lord Advocate when the SNP took power – a departure from past convention.  Our money is on an internal promotion, but we are notorious for our inability to foresee the future.